Using Expert Models in Human Reliability Analysis - A Dependence Assessment Method Based on Fuzzy Logic by Podofillini, L. et al.
Using Expert Models in Human Reliability Analysis - A
Dependence Assessment Method Based on Fuzzy Logic
L. Podofillini, V.N. Dang, Enrico Zio, Piero Baraldi, Massimo Librizzi
To cite this version:
L. Podofillini, V.N. Dang, Enrico Zio, Piero Baraldi, Massimo Librizzi. Using Expert Models
in Human Reliability Analysis - A Dependence Assessment Method Based on Fuzzy Logic.




Submitted on 26 Jul 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
USING EXPERT MODELS IN HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
– A DEPENDENCE ASSESSMENT METHOD BASED 
ON FUZZY LOGIC 
 
 
L. Podofillini, V.N. Dang, E. Zio, P. Baraldi, M. Librizzi 
Abstract  
In Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), dependence analysis refers to assessing the 
influence of the failure of the operators to perform one task on the failure probabilities 
of subsequent tasks. A commonly used  approach is the Technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction (THERP). The assessment of the dependence level in THERP is a highly 
subjective judgment based  on general rules for the influen ce of five main factors. A 
frequently used  alternative method extends the THERP model with decision trees. 
Such trees should increase the repeatability of the assessments but they simplify the 
relationships among the factors and the dependence level. Moreover, the basis for 
these simplifications and the resulting tree is d ifficult to trace. The aim of this work is a 
method for dependence assessment in HRA that captures the rules used  by experts to 
assess dependence levels and incorporates this knowledge into an algorithm and 
software tool to be used  by HRA analysts. A Fuzzy Expert System (FES) underlies the 
method. The method and the associated expert elicitation process are demonstrated 
with a working model. The expert rules are elicited  systematically and converted  into a 
traceable, explicit, and  computable model. Anchor situations are provided as guidance 
for the HRA analyst’s judgment of the input factors. The expert model and the FES-
based  dependence assessment method make the expert rules accessible to the analyst 
in a usable and repeatable means, with an explicit and  traceable basis. 
Keywords: human reliability analysis; human action dependence; expert 
judgment; fuzzy expert system; expert elicitation.  
Acronyms /  Abbreviations 
DT – decision tree    FES – fuzzy expert system 
FL – fuzzy logic    HFE – human failure events 
HRA – Human Reliability Analysis  MF – membership function 
PSA – Probabilistic Safety Assessment THERP – Technique for Human Error Rate 
Prediction 
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1 Introduction  
Expert judgment is required  in many areas of risk analysis, where the relevant factors 
and their relationships are complex and the data are insufficient as a basis for either a 
statistical estimate or for constructing an empirical model with which estimates may be 
obtained . Two ways of using expert judgment can be distinguished. The first way 
relates to collecting and aggregating the judgment of experts on the variables of 
interest, e.g. a failure probability or a seismic hazard  curve (e.g. Cooke, 1991). Formal 
approaches for this exist, which are very useful to bring out the assumptions and 
reasoning underlying the judgments and to document them so that they can be 
appraised  by others (Cooke, 1991; O’Hagan et al., 2006). However, some disadvantages 
are the cost and time they require and the potential presence of biases in the expert 
estimates (for a complete d iscussion see: Otway & von Winterfeld t, 1992). A second 
way of using expert judgment is based  on collecting information from experts to build 
a computable model (called  the expert model) with which the desired  value may be 
obtained . Examples include the computerized  diagnostic aids used  in nuclear p ower 
plants, e.g. Chang et al. (1995), and  clinical decision support systems used in medicine, 
e.g. Kawamoto et al. (2005). 
The work reported  here addresses an application of expert judgment in  HRA, the part 
of PSAs that deals with human performance and its impact on risk. In HRA, 
dependence analysis refers to assessing the influence of the failure of the operators to 
perform one task on the failure probabilities of subsequent tasks (Swain & Guttman, 
1983). In qualitative terms, a dependence is said to exist between two tasks, that is two 
Human Failure Events (HFEs) if the failure of the second HFE is more likely given that 
the operators have failed  in their performance of the first HFE than following success 
of the first HFE.  
The assessment of dependence has a significant impact on the overall results of a PSA, 
since the dependent failure probability may be an order of magnitude or more larger 
than the independent one. An appropriate assessment of dependence is thus essential 
to avoid  underestimation of the risk and to ensure a realistic risk profile from the PSA 
results. In identifying the HFEs for which dependence should  be considered , i.e. the 
scenarios in which multiple HFEs appear, a common practice is to use large screening 
probabilities for the HFEs. If the probabilities estimated  without accounting for 
dependence are used , the relevant sequences (with multiple HFEs) may be truncated. 
A quantification of the scenarios without consideration of dependencies may miss 
candidates for potential dependencies (NUREG-1792, 2005). 
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The development of an expert model for HRA dependence assessment and an 
assessment method based  on this model is aimed at increasing the repeatability of 
these assessments. The expert model can systematically and transparently represent 
the assumptions and rules underlying the assessment ; at the same time, it can 
represent relatively complex assessment rules that account for the interactions among 
the input factors. The attractiveness of a method based on an expert model is that it 
makes the expert knowledge and rules accessible to an HRA analyst. Since dependence 
assessments are needed within each HRA (each PSA study), such a method can 
circumvent the need  to convene an expert or experts in a formal elicitation  for each 
study. 
This work focuses on dependencies among post-initiator HFEs. In current PSAs, the 
dependence model from the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
HRA method  (Swain & Guttman, 1983) is commonly used . It has two parts:  a 
qualitative assessment of a dependence level, ranging in d iscrete steps from zero 
(independent tasks or actions) to com plete dependence, and  the quantification of the 
impact of the assessed dependence level on the conditional probability of the 
subsequent task based  on a set of formulas. The THERP model refers to five main 
factors: spatial relatedness, time relationship , functional relatedness, stress, and the 
similarities among the personnel performing the tasks. While the THERP dependence 
model provides general guidelines for the influence of these factors on the dependence 
level (cf. Table 10-1 in Swain & Guttman, 1983), the assignment of the level is 
essentially a direct expert judgment, a highly subjective process that can be weak in 
terms of transparency and repeatibility. The ASME Standard  for Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment notes that ―the state of the art in HRA is  such that the assessment of 
dependency is largely based  on the analyst’s judgement.‖ (Note (1) to HR-G7, ASME, 
2005). 
To address these issues and  reduce the subjectivity inherent in judging the dependence 
level d irectly, the assignment of the dependence level is frequently supported  with 
decision trees (DTs), for instance, in the SPAR-H (Gertman et al., 2005) method, in the 
EPRI HRA ―calculator‖(Julius et al., 2005), as well as in the recently presented  method 
DEPEND-HRA (Cepin, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). However, the decision tree representation 
frequently very much simplifies the relationships among the input factors and the 
dependence level. In addition, the basis for the decision tree is d ifficult to trace. It 
should  be noted  that although the mentioned  methods have been specifically 
developed for nuclear power plants applications, human failure dependence 
assessment is an important part of the HRA for any technical system (Kennedy et al., 
2007). 
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Current practice has a number of weaknesses. The absence of specific guidance makes 
the use of the THERP dependence method d ifficult and  the results may lack 
traceability and repeatability. This also makes the review of the assessment by a second 
person d ifficult (e.g. in peer or regulatory reviews). The use of DTs improves the 
situation: the analyst has to give judgments on the input factors, but is not required  to 
draw conclusions on the dependence level, which the DT yields. The central idea is 
that the input factors should  be less subjective quantities than the dependence level 
(optimally, they should  be ―measurable‖). Yet, DTs are not flexible in the sense that the 
analyst judgments are typically constrained  to rigid  options, which refer to extreme 
situations (Yes/ No, High/ Low). Moving away from binary options also increases the 
number of branches and the combinations of factors to evaluate. Moreover, d ifferent 
implementations of DTs exist, which may produce significantly d ifferent results 
(Cepin, 2008c): since DTs are often not built from a traceable process of expert 
elicitation, it is difficult to understand the reasons if two DTs give d ifferent results.  
Section 2 d iscusses these shortcomings in more detail.  
Note that another recent subject of research related  to dependence assessment is on 
how dependent HFEs should  be incorporated  in large system fault tree analysis 
(Vaurio, 2000). This subject relates to dependencies among pre-initiator HFEs and  a 
more detailed  d iscussion is outside the scope of the present paper . Also related  to 
dependence assessment is the idea of the existence of human performance limiting 
values (HPLV) (Kirwan, 2008). It may be the case that accident sequences have very 
low joint human error probability (e.g. 10-4 or 10-5), even after dependence is evaluated:  
the idea is that HPLV should  be applied to include for possibly overlooked error 
mechanisms or error-inducing conditions. 
The aim of this work is a method for dependence assessment in HRA that captures the 
rules used  by experts to assess dependence levels and  incorporates this knowledge into 
an algorithm and software tool to be used  by HRA analysts. The Fuzzy Expert System 
(FES) formalism underlies the method. A FES collects the experts’ knowledge as a set 
of Fuzzy Logic (FL) rules that are mathematically manipulated  by Fuzzy Set theory 
(Zadeh, 1965). Fuzzy set theory has been exploited  for HRA in a number of 
applications (Terano et al., 1983; Onisawa, 1988a, 1988b; Liang & Wang, 1993; Kim & 
Bishu, 1996; Suresh et al., 1996; Huang et al., 1996; Richei et al., 2001; Konstandinidou et 
al., 2006; Marseguerra et al., 2006). In most of these, the focus is on using FL to convert 
human error context descriptions into inputs for existing HRA methods, with the aim 
of accounting for ambiguity and subjectivity of the descriptions. For example, in 
Konstandinidou et al. (2006) and  Marseguerra et al. (2006), fuzzy logic is applied  to 
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compute HEPs via the CREAM method, by converting the characterization of the 
performance shaping factors into fuzzy numbers. Only in Richei et al. (2001) is the 
problem of build ing a FES from the expert knowledge also addressed .  
At this stage, the focus of the work has been to investigate the suitability and  
practicality of the FES representation  for an HRA dependence assessment method for 
post-initiator HFEs. This paper presents the basic concepts of the proposed method  
and demonstrates the approach using a working model of the dependence 
relationships. The working model is intended to represent a set of moderately complex 
relationships among the input factors and the dependence level, which could  be 
expected  from an expert elicitation. These relationships represent one possible 
interpretation of the THERP dependence guidelines, but one with more detail. It 
admitted ly does not include all relevant factors but its complexity is sufficient for the 
purpose of demonstrating the methodology. The details of the FES model are reported 
in a companion paper (Zio et al., 2009).  
To illustrate its use, the FES-based  has been applied  for dependence assessment of a 
pair of operator actions in response to an accident scenario in a Boiling Water  Reactor. 
The FES-based  method for assessing dependence has the advantage of being able to 
represent fully the experts’ rules (in this case, the rules of the working model), 
including rules for the interaction of the dependence (input) factors. With anchor  
situations provided as guidance for the HRA analyst’s judgment of the input factors, 
the method yields the dependence level based  on the expert rules. An expert elicitation 
to obtain a comprehensive set of rules to replace the working model is planned for  
future work. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the problem of 
dependence assessment, of the current practice and limitations. Section 3 presents the 
features of the proposed dependence assessment method . The approach for building 
the underlying FES-based  model is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents an 
application of the method . Section 6 d iscusses traceability, repeatability, verification 
and valid ity issues. 
2 Dependence assessment in HRA: practice and 
limitations 
2.1 The dependence assessment method in THERP 
The dependence assessment method  in the THERP HRA method (Swain & Guttman, 
1983) is one of the most widely used  in the PSA practice. Referred  to as the ―THERP 
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method‖ in this paper, this dependence assessment method has the following main 
components: 
 Use of conditional human error probabilities (HEPs) to model the effect of 
dependence: the THERP approach amounts to evaluate the probability of 
failure of one task, when it is known that the previous task has failed . 
 Discretization of the conditional HEP into five ranges representing different 
levels of dependence: zero, low, moderate, high, complete. 
 A formula for computing the dependent, conditional p robability for each 
dependence level. For a low level of dependence, the formula produces for  low 
values of the independent HEP (i.e. <0.01) a nominal conditional probability 
value of 0.05 with lower and upper bounds of 0.015 and 0.15, respectively.  
 Guidelines for assessing the level of dependence (summarized  in Table 10-1 of 
Swain & Guttman (1983)).  
The user of the method must analyze the pair of successive tasks and assess the level of 
dependence. To support the analysis of the tasks dependence, the THERP guidelines 
suggest the factors that should  be considered  (THERP Table 10-1 of Swain & Guttman  
(1983)): closeness in time and space, functional relatedness (e.g. tasks related  to the 
same subsystem), stress, similarity of the performers (status, training, responsibility, 
and „many social and  psychological factors―).  
For example, for the factor closeness in time and space, the guideline reads (item 3 of 
Table 10-1 of Swain & Guttman (1983)): 
―Evaluate the spatial and  time relationship among all events. Dependence 
between any two events increases as the events occur closer in space and 
time. For example, d isplays or controls that are physically close to each 
other or that must be manipulated  at about the same time have a higher 
level of dependence than items that are widely separated  either spatially or 
as to the time of their manipulation.‖  
These guidelines cannot be used  systematically and consistently as a basis for assessing 
the dependence level because a lot of room is left to interpretation. This makes the 
assessment a rather d ifficult task, requiring a considerable amount of expert judgment, 
which may lack transparency and traceability and leads to low repeatability of the 
results. Another problem with the d irect elicitation of probability is the presence of 
biases, of many types (Cooke, 1991; Otway, H. & von Winterfeld t, D., 1992).  
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2.2 Supporting the THERP model with decision trees 
The expert judgment assessment of the level of dependence is in practice often 
supported  with a decision tree (DT).  In these cases, the quantitative impact of the 
assessed  dependence level is still modeled  with the THERP dependence assessment 
method. 
Repeatability should  improve when expert judgment is structured  and supported  by a 
DT. The analyst has to give judgments on the input factors, but is not required  to draw 
conclusions on the dependence level, which comes from the model. An example is 
shown in Figure 1, which reports the SPAR-H DT for post-initiator HFEs (Gertman et 
al., 2005). The input factors of the model are (Figure 1):  
 Crews (Same/ Different)  
 Time (Close in time/ Not close in time)  
 Location (Same/ Different)  
 Cues (Additional cues/ No additional cues). 
Different implementations of DTs exist. Cepin (2008b) shows that this can lead  to 
significant d ifferences in the result of the HRA and in the evaluation of the risk 
contributors. Since a traceable process of expert elicitation is often missing , it is d ifficult 
to understand the reasons if two DTs give d ifferent results.  
Another limitation is that DTs are not flexible and may not allow assessments to be 
representative of the context under analysis. The need  to avoid an excessive branching 
of the tree usually limits the number of branches per factor  to two to three values 
(labels). These labels represent extreme Yes/ No conditions (see Figure 1 for example), 
which may be d ifficult to match to a particular context. Indeed, there may be consensus 
on considering a separation by 5 minutes as ―close in time‖ and one of hours as ―not 
close in time‖. However, a separation of 20 minutes may be d ifficult to match to any of 
the two options, thus requiring a more intermediate judgment that would  better 
represent the context. 
 
INSERT Figure 1. The SPAR-H dependence decision tree 
 
INSERT Table 1. The EPRI HRA Calculator ® dependence 
decision tree (Grobbelaar et al., 2005). 
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3 Basic concepts of the dependence assessment 
method 
Figure 2 shows a high-level overview of the dependence assessment method. The 
underlying FES model and  the expert elicitation process for its construction are 
presented  in the next Section 4. The mathematical details of the FES can be found in a 
companion paper (Zio et al., 2009). The d ifferent components of the method are 
described  next.  
 
INSERT Figure 2. Overview of the dependence model. Different 
models are needed for pre-initiators, and different types of post-
initiators. 
 
3.1 Input factors 
Similarly to the DTs approach, each of the input factors is represented by a linguistic 
variable, qualified  in terms of linguistic labels (Figure 3). For example: input factor 
―similarity of performers‖ may be qualified  in terms of a linguistic variable with 
linguistic labels: None - Low – Medium … - Very high. Unlike with DTs, the number of 
linguistic labels for each input factor is higher than two, thus giving more flexibility to 
the input judgments.  
At the same time, the use of a higher number of linguistic labels may become a source 
of variability in the inputs, so that concrete guidance is needed for the analyst 
judgments. As shown in Figure 3, this is provided through anchor points that represent 
prototype conditions of the input factors for a typology of tasks . Different dependence 
models and thus d ifferent sets of anchors may be used  for pre-initiators, different types 
of post initiators, etc. The selection of the proper anchors and their characterization in 
terms of the linguistic labels is one of the outputs of the expert elicitation process. 
Note that numerous studies on expert judgment elicitation have shown that the use of 
anchors may be counterproductive and bias the judgments if the underling scale is 
continuous (see Brewer & Chapman, 2002 for an example, among many others, of a 
paper d iscussing the anchor effect, and  Stevens, 1946, for the definitions of the 
measurement scales). However, in our case the anchors are essential because the scale 
on which they are placed  is very abstract for the analyst (what does high ―similarity  of 
cues‖ mean? or what does a similarity of performers of 0.33 mean?). Anchors therefore 
are necessary to provide reference situations that can orient an analyst. 
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With respect to the context characterization, the analyst can provide judgments on the 
input factors in d ifferent ways, for example on a scale (Figure 3). Four anchors are 
shown in the figure:  the analyst may provide a point inpu t on the scale (input 1), or 
the range where his/ her belief belongs (input 2).  
A feature of FES is that they allow overlapping of the linguistic labels (overlapping 
horizontal bars in Figure 3) to represent the fact that in the common perception, the 
transition between the linguistic concepts associated to the labels (e.g. between 
―medium‖ and  ―high‖) is not crisp, but often uncertain and ambiguous. This can be 
formally accounted  for by introducing overlapping fuzzy sets to represent the input 
variables. Figure 4 shows a possible association of fuzzy sets and  trapezoidal 
membership functions. Note that the association is not shown to the analyst who 
interfaces only with anchor points and  linguistic labels. 
Indeed, the natural scale for the input factors is continuous and the d iscretization 
introduced by the overlapping labels is a simplification. Yet, this does not seem to be a 
limitation. The five-level scale is actually attractive because experts and analysts are 
already very familiar with it from the five THERP levels. Furthermore, as it will be 
presented  in the next Section 3.2, the basis of the fuzzy logic model is a set o f rules. 
This is a concept with which experts and  analysts should be already familiar with, 
since rules (although much coarser) are at the basis of DTs as well.  
 
Insert Figure 3. Analyst elicitation on anchored scale; two analyst 
input types are shown: as a point value (arrow) and as an interval 
(horizontal bar). 
 
Insert Figure 4. Possible association of fuzzy sets and membership 
functions (trapezoids) to the input qualitative variable. 
 
 
3.2 The underlying model 
The inference model represents the relations between the input factors and the 
dependence level. This represents the expert knowledge, which in FES is modeled  into 
a set of rules capturing the relationships between the d ifferent values of the input and 
output variables. An example rule reads as follows: 
IF  




 Dependence is ―High‖ 
The next Section presents the expert elicitation process to convert the expert 
knowledge into fuzzy rules. 
The input judgments of the analysts are converted  into fuzzy numbers, which 
represent the degree to which the judgments match each of the qualitative labels. The 
fact that a judgment can match, with d ifferent degrees, multiple labels allows FES to 
handle uncertain and ambiguous statements. Multiple rules are then activated , with a 
degree that follows from the degree to which each input statement matches the labels 
involved in the rule. The degree of activation of the rules is then the basis for the 
derivation of the output of the model, which, as described  in the next Section 3.3, is 
represented  by degrees of belief in the d ifferent dependence levels. The FL procedure 
used  in this work to associate the output of the model to a given input assessment is 
based  on the Mamdami fuzzy logic (Zio et al., 2009). Accordingly, the degree to which 
an input assessment matches a label involved in a rule is computed as the maximum 
value of the intersection of the input assessment and label fuzzy sets (Figure 5, left), the 
degree of activation of a rule is computed  as the minimum value of the degree to which 
each input assessment matches the labels involved in the rules  (Figure 5, right) and  the 
contribution to the output of a given rule is the minimum value between the rule 
degree of activation and the fuzzy set in the rule output  (Figure 5, right). Finally the 
output fuzzy set is obtained  by taking the union of all the involved rule output s. 
Insert Figure 5. Left: example of computation of the degree to 
which the Factor 1 input assessment matches the label “Low ” and 
the Factor 2 input assessment the label “High” . Right: 
computation of the degree of activation of the rule If “Factor 1” is 
“Low” and “Factor 2” is “High” THEN “Dependence” is 
“Medium” as minimum value between the degrees to which 
Factor 1 and Factor 2 input assessments match the corresponding 
labels in the rule. 
3.3 Outputs 
From the input factors describing the context of two successive actions with respect to 
their failure dependence, the method  produces two outputs. The first consists in the 
degrees of belief (expressed  in terms of possibility) for the d ifferent dependence levels. 
The THERP dependence levels are used  (None, Low, Medium, High, Complete). This 
output shows how the analysts’ judgments translate into a possibilistic distribution of 
the dependence levels.  
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The second type of output gives quantitative figures to the dependence level. This 
output is the expected  value of the conditional probability and its associated 
uncertainty. These are the figures that are included into the PSA.  
The operation that allows passing from the first type of output to the second is called 
defuzzification (Zadeh, 1965) and, to be formalized , entails associating fuzzy sets and 
degrees of membership to the levels of dependence.  
In the method proposed in this paper, this is done by eliciting information from the 
THERP handbook. In particular, Table 20-21 of (Swain & Guttman, 1983) suggests 
nominal values and uncertainty bounds for the conditional probability associated  to 
each dependence level. A possible association of fuzzy sets to the THERP dependence 
levels consists in taking membership functions with triangular shape in log10 scale 
centered  on the associated  dependence level nominal values and with supports given 
by the lower and upper confidence bounds, as reported  in Figure 6. 
Note that the presented method is still based  on the five THERP dependence levels, 
although a finer characterization of the dependence level could  have been obtained 
with more levels or by adopting a continuous dependence scale (for example, using 
Bayesian belief nets). However, it was decided  to use the THERP dependence levels 
and  the THERP relationships between the levels and  the conditional HEPs because 
these are familiar to experts and analysts. This is an important point for the acceptance 
of the method.  
 
Insert Figure 6. Fuzzy sets and membership functions associated 
to the THERP dependence levels. Elicited from THERP guidelines 
(Swain & Guttman, 1983). 
 
4 Building the dependence model: example on a 
working model 
The concepts of the elicitation process are here illustrated  on a working model of 
dependence, applicable for post-initiator HFEs of a nuclear power plant for full-power 
scenarios. The actual expert elicitation exercise will be performed in subsequent work. 
The information that needs to be provided by the expert is: 
 The important factor relevant to dependence and how they relate 
 Selection and positioning of the anchors 
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 Impact of the factors on the dependence level 
4.1 Determining input factors and anchors 
The first information to elicit from the expert concerns the important factors for 
dependence and how they relate. An influence diagram like the one in Figure 7 is the 
result:  it shows the working model used  to explore the methodology.  
Table 2 lists the input factors, the qualitative labels and  the anchor points used  in the 
working model. The expert has to locate the anchors on the input scale, so as to build 
the input interface of Figure 3.  
According to the working model, three factors d irectly impact the dependence level 
(Figure 7): ―closeness in time‖, ―task relatedness‖ and ―similarity of performers‖. 
―Tasks relatedness‖ is further specified  in terms of the ―similarity of cues‖ and 
―similarity of functions/ goals‖ , as Figure 7 shows. These factors include most, but not 
all, of the relevant factors. For example, the use of the same procedures may also have 
influence on the dependence between two tasks. On the other hand, this working 
model was considered  to be of enough complexity for this illustrative application  of 
the methodology.  
Note that the scale for factor ―closeness in time‖ does not relate to an absolute time 
scale (Figure 3). For example, the anchor point ―5 minutes‖ is meant to be an example 
of the concept of closeness in time, rather than a time mea surement: a judgment of ―8 
minutes‖ could  be also placed  on the ―5 minutes‖ anchor position if the analyst feels 
that the situations are not d ifferent. Alternative anchors for ―closeness in time‖ are 
under evaluation, relating to typical tasks in NPP. In this way, as for example it was 
done in Kirwan (1997c), the judgement is not only connected  w ith the numeric time 
separation.  
Figure 8 shows the results of the expert elicitation of the input factors and of the 
anchors. The Figure shows the input interface of the model as seen by the analyst. 
 
Insert Figure 7. Influence diagram of the working model. 
 
Insert Figure 8. Results from elicitation of the input factors and 
the anchors: the dependence model as seen by the analyst. 
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4.2 Relationship between the input factors and dependence level 
The expert knowledge on dependence is converted  into the FES rules. This is done by: 
1) using statements given by the experts to fill some of the rules of the fuzzy expert 
system, and 2) filling the rest of the fuzzy rules via a rules interpolation approach.  
The statements from the expert can be of d ifferent forms. In this paper each statement 
evaluates particular combinations of the input labels. When the expert is asked to 
evaluate the selected  contexts, he/ she is also shown the relative positioning of the 
anchors on the scale, so as to help him / her to contextualize his/ her statements (Figure 
9). These evaluations allow partially filling the Table of rules, as shown in Figure 9 for 
―task relatedness‖.  
Then, the missing ―relationships‖ are filled  in by an automatic ―interpolation‖ 
procedure which smoothly spreads the consequent labels over the fuzzy rules  
(Marseguerra et al., 2004; Zio et al., 2009) (Figure 10). 
 
Insert Figure 9. Table of rules for the intermediate variable Task 
relatedness (partial fill from the expert statements) 
 
Insert Figure 10. Table of rules for the intermediate variable Task 
relatedness (complete fill by rules interpolation) 
 
5 Use of the working model: dependence in 
operators’ early response to ATWS 
5.1 Scenario description 
The case study considered  refers to a set of operator actions required  to avoid  excessive 
boron d ilution in the reactor cooling system in case of an Anticipated  Transient 
Without Scram (ATWS) scenario in a nuclear Boiling Water Reactor (BWR).  
In the considered  scenario, the operators have successfully initiated  the Standby Liquid 
Control System (SLCS) to shut the reactor down. To facilitate the reactor shut down, 
the operators are d irected  by the procedures to increase the void ing by reducing the 
level in the reactor to the Top of Active Fuel (TAF). Additionally, they are required  to 
inhibit the actuation of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), which is 
activated  by the signal of low water level in the reactor, generated  while lowering the 
reactor water level to TAF. In case of failure to inhibit the ADS, the reactor pressure 
would  be automatically decreased  and low pressure injection systems (Core Spray 
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System, CSS), would  be activated. The injected  water could  dilute the boron injected  by 
the SLCS and the consequential failure to control reactivity. In case of failure to inhibit 
ADS actuation, the operators are called  to control the level in the reactor using low 
pressure injection, tripping one of the CSS pumps and controlling the other pump.  
The signal to activate the ADS is generated about 7 minutes after the event of failure to 
scram.  At that point, the operators have about 15 minutes to take actions to limit the 
low pressure injection flow. 
The pair of operator tasks involved in the dependence assessment are 1) inhibit the 
ADS and  2) control the reactor vessel level in order to prevent d iluting boron 
concentration after failure to inhibit the ADS. Both actions are d irected by the same 
emergency procedure. 
5.2 Five cases of analyst judgment  
At first, three judgment cases are presented , corresponding to different possible 
interpretations of the context by the analyst. The last two cases show how the model 
responds to the variation of one input from cases 2 and 3. 
Case 1 – input judgments as point values on anchors   
Figure 11 shows an example of this type of input on the model interface and Figure 12 
shows the corresponding fuzzification of the judgments by means of trapezoidal MFs. 
 ―Time‖ (upper left corner of Figure 11 and Figure 12): as said  in the scenario 
description of Section 5.1, the separation in time of the two actions is expected 
to be around 15 minutes.  The most reasonable anchor representing this context 
is ―5 minutes‖, the conservative judgment closest to the real context.   
 ―Cues‖ (upper right corner of Figure 11 and Figure 12): the initial cues for ADS 
inhibition are related  to high reactor power level due to the failure to scram. 
The cues for control of low pressure injection are related  to the reactor vessel 
level, which has to be manually maintained . This situation matches the anchor 
―different indicators for d ifferent parameters‖.   
 ―Goals‖ (lower right corner of Figure 11 and Figure 12): the two actions relate to 
the same function (shut down the reactor by boron control), carried  out via 
d ifferent systems. This situation matches the anchor ―same function by 
d ifferent systems‖ . 
 ―Performers‖ (lower left corner of Figure 11 and Figure 12): the action is carried 
out by the same team. This matches the anchor ―same team‖. 
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Figure 13 reports the output of the dependence model as it results from the above 
judgments. The model assigns a level of ―Low ‖, without uncertainty  (in the Figure, the 
possibility of ―Low‖ is 1, while the possibility of all the other levels is 0). Without 
entering into the details of the underlying fuzzy expert system, the reason for this 
result is that the input judgments are such that only one rule is activated , i.e.: 
IF Time is Close AND 
Cue similarity is None AND 
Similarity of functions/ goals is High AND 
Similarity of performers is High 
THEN Dependence is Low 
Yet the analyst may not be satisfied with the judgments of Figure 11, as they do not 
incorporate entirely his/ her belief on the context. In particular, ambiguity and 
uncertainty may come with his judgments. The next cases show how the presented 
model handles these aspects. 
 
INSERT Figure 11. Analyst input on the anchored scale for case 
1: point estimates matching the anchors 
 
 
INSERT Figure 12. Fuzzy input with trapezoidal MFs for case 1: 
point estimates matching the anchors.  
 
 
INSERT Figure 13. Output of dependence level for case 1: point 
estimates matching the anchors. 
 
 
Case 2 – input judgments as point values between labels or between anchors  
This case shows how the model responds to a judgment of the analyst which is in 
between labels. To better show the effect of this type of judgment, only one input is 
given as an ―in between‖ judgment (i.e. similarity of cues), while the other ones are left 
to the values of Case 1. 
Consider the assessment on ―cues‖ at the basis of the judgment in Case 1. An analyst 
may want to represent that cues are not totally d ifferent  as it is implied  in the 
description of Case 1. Indeed, ADS actuation is commanded by the signal of low water 
level in the reactor.  Therefore, level in the reactor is also one of the parameters that the 
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operators have to monitor while inhibiting ADS. The context is therefore more 
ambiguous than that represented  in Case 1. The analyst may therefore feel more 
confident to assign a point assessment somewhere in between the label ―NONE‖, 
representing ―different indicators for d ifferent parameters‖ and the label ―LOW‖, 
representing a somewhat higher level of dependence.  
Figure 14 shows the input of the analyst on the model interface and Figure 15 shows 
the corresponding fuzzification of the judgments by means of trapezoidal MFs. 
Figure 16 reports the output of the dependence model in form of the possibility values 
of the d ifferent levels of dependence. It can be seen that the ambiguity of the judgment 
reflects in the model output, which assigns possibility to both levels of ―low‖ and 
―medium‖ (in particular, 0.8 to LOW and 0.2 to MEDIUM). The relative possibilities 
values of the low and medium labels depend on the location of the input assessment 
arrow of the analysis in Figure 14. 
The reason for this output is that as a result of the input judgments, two rules are 
activated, i.e.: 
IF Time is Close AND 
Cue similarity is None AND 
Similarity of functions/ goals is High AND 
Similarity of performers is High 
THEN Dependence is Low 
IF Time is Close AND 
Cue similarity is Low AND 
Similarity of functions/ goals is High AND 
Similarity of performers is High  




INSERT Figure 14. Analyst input on the anchored scale for case 
2: point estimates between anchors. 
 
INSERT  Figure 15. Fuzzy input with trapezoidal MFs for case 2: 
point estimates between anchors.  
 
INSERT Figure 16. Output of dependence level for case 2: point 
estimates between anchors. 
 
Case 3 – range assessments (uncertainty) 
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This case shows how uncertainty in the context can be represented  in the jud gment and 
how this reflects in the output dependence assessment. Again, only one input is varied 
from the judgments at the basis of Case 2 to show this effect. 
Consider the judgment on the input factor ―closeness in time‖. According to the 
scenario description, the operators have about 15 minutes to take actions to limit the 
low pressure injection flow. In Case 1, in order to have the input matching an anchor, 
the conservative judgment of 5 minutes was made. However, more realistically an 
analyst may want to represent the uncertainty in the ―about 15 minutes‖ as an interval 
range between 5 and 20 minutes (Figure 17 and Figure 18).   
Figure 19 reports the output of the dependence model in form of the possibility values 
of the d ifferent levels of dependence. It can be seen that as a consequence of the varied 
input judgment, the output assessment is spread  on the three values of ZERO, LOW, 
and MEDIUM, peaked on the LOW level.  The activated  rules are in fact: 
 
IF Time is Neither AND 
Cue similarity is None AND 
Similarity of functions/ goals is High AND 
Similarity of performers is High  
THEN Dependence is Zero 
IF Time is Neither AND 
Cue similarity is Low AND 
Similarity of functions/ goals is High AND 
Similarity of performers is High  
THEN Dependence is Low 
IF Time is Close AND 
Cue similarity is None AND 
Similarity of functions/ goals is High AND 
Similarity of performers is High  
THEN Dependence is Low 
IF Time is Close AND 
Cue similarity is Low AND 
Similarity of functions/ goals is High AND 
Similarity of performers is High  




Insert Figure 17. Analyst input on the anchored scale for case 3: 
range assessment 
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Insert Figure 18. Fuzzy input with trapezoidal MFs for case 3: 
range assessment. 
Insert Figure 19. Output of dependence level for case 3: range 
assessment. 
 
Cases 4 and 5 – response of the model to judgment variation on one input   
This cases show how the model responds to the variation of one input from the values 
that were used  in cases 2 and 3. Note, these last two cases do not correspond to a 
specific dependence analysis assessment, but they are presented  here as examples of 
sensitivity analysis. 
The inputs for cases 4 and 5 are the same as those of cases 2 and 3, respectively, except 
for the judgment on factor ―similarity of cues‖, which is now centered  on the anchor 
―single indicator for the same parameter‖ (with falls on the input label HIGH, without 
overlapping to any other label).  
The output of the dependence model is reported  in Figure 20: as expected , both output 
assessments are shifted  towards higher dependence levels, as a consequence that the 
input judgment has been moved towards higher similarity of cues. In case 4, the level 
of HIGH is assigned without uncertainty (Figure 20, left), because the input assessment 
is such to activate only one rule: 
IF Time is Close AND 
Cue similarity is High  AND 
Similarity of functions/ goals is High AND 
Similarity of performers is High 
THEN Dependence is 
High 
  
Instead , the output d istribution of case 5 is spread  over two levels (MEDIUM and 
HIGH), as an effect of the uncertainty in the ―closeness in time‖ judgment, which is 
expressed  as an interval range (Figure 20, right). For brevity, the rules activated  in case 
5 are not reported .   




6 Discussion  
6.1 Repeatability and traceability 
The motivation behind  the development of the presented  method has been to give 
repeatability and traceability to the dependence assessment among successive human 
actions affecting safety of installation .  
Repeatability comes from the fact that the proposed method is based  on  an explicit, 
computable model. Indeed, as with DTs, the judgments are given on the input factors 
and the applicable dependence level follows from the model and  not from direct expert 
judgment. With respect to the judgments to be provided on the input factors, 
repeatability benefits from provid ing anchor situations to the analyst: the more 
representative and defined  the anchors are, the less controversial, and  therefore 
variable, the input judgments are.  
Unlike DTs, traceability of the dependence model is assured  by a systematic expert 
elicitation approach, made up of two traceable steps (first fill and interpolation  of the 
fuzzy logic rules relating the input to the dependence level). Once the dependence 
model is built, it is easy to go back and verify the base expert’s statements that 
originated  the model. In principle, the traceability of the process to build  DTs could  be 
potentially improved by provid ing better documentation, but this has been rarely the 
case. 
6.2 Verification and validation issues 
Model verification and validation are two essential steps in the development of any 
method  and are being taken into consideration in the development of the present 
dependence method .  
Verification is intended as the process to make sure that the model represents correctly 
the experts’ knowledge (O’Keefe & Smith, 1987). After construction, the expert model 
has to be assessed  (verified) by the experts whose expertise is captured  in the model. In 
this phase, feedback needs to be provided to the experts to allow them to determine 
whether the expert system model is a good representation of their knowledge, and  if 
not, to modify the model appropriately. Techniques for provid ing this feedback are 
currently under investigation by the authors: they  include visualization techniques as 
well as importance measures. Some preliminary results can be found  in Podofillini et 
al. (2008). 
A fundamental step for the acceptance of the dependence model is its validation. Yet, 
the empirical validation of a human error dependence model is a very d ifficult task. In 
what follows, the status of HRA validation generally and as it regards dependence is 
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outlined . The most significant HRA validation efforts have addressed  mostly failure 
probabilities for ―execution‖, that is, carrying out a series of actions or steps on a 
system. A review of validation efforts for a number  of HRA methods can be found in 
Kirwan (1997b). These sources note the d ifficulty of validating the failure probabilities 
for decision or d iagnosis that are predicted with HRA methods. This is due in 
particular to the lack of reference data, which in turn is caused  by the sensitivity of 
decision failures to a broad  range of variables (contextual factors). Indeed, data 
collection efforts have addressed  mostly failure probabilities for ―execution‖, as, for 
example, in Kirwan, et al. (2008), where the focus is on communication errors.  
There are on-going efforts that should  improve the state of HRA data in the future. 
One of these is an attempt to analyze operating experience and to obtain in this way 
empirical relationships between the factors and the observed human failure events: the 
Human Error Repository and Analysis (HERA) project and  database sponsored  by the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  (Hallbert et al., 2006). A second effort is the 
International HRA Empirical Study being performed by an international group of 
organizations jointly with the OECD Halden Reactor Project, in which the predictions 
of HRA methods are being compared  with simulator data  (Lois et al., 2008 and Dang et 
al., 2007). While both quantitative predictions (the HEPs) and qualitative predictions 
(the ―driving‖ or most important input factors identified  in the Human Reliability 
Analysis) will be addressed  in this work, the number of data points will not be 
sufficient to validate comprehensively the relationship between the input variables and 
the predicted  failure probabilities, a  relationship represented  by each HRA method. 
Concerning the validation of a dependence model, the basis or mechanisms that 
potentially lead  to dependence within a series of actions relate strongly to the decision -
making of the personnel associated  with these actions. Therefore, one may anticipate 
that data will be very d ifficult to collect. A major  reason is that the action and failure 
probability of interest are conditioned on a previous personnel failure. Given the 
expected  performance levels, this initial failure is relatively d ifficult to ―provoke‖ 
systematically and realistically such that the subsequent performance can be examined. 
In case the validation strategy would be to test the model’s predictions against 
simulator data, this poses challenges also as to how the simulator experiments should 
be designed (e.g. what accident scenarios should  be simulated).  
This suggests that a model of dependence for HRA cannot be based  on (built from) a 
set of data from which the overall relationship between the input variables and the 
output variable of interest can be quantitatively estimated . For the same reason, it can 
be expected  that the validation of such a model cannot be done against a 
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comprehensive set of data that is able to explore extensively the range of the model 
response.   
However, these d ifficulties should  not d iscourage and some way of test ing the 
empirical basis of the model should be pursued. Three concept alternatives can be 
anticipated  here:  
 Validation of the model against a limited  set of data, thus validating only some 
of the input-output relationships, only those that cover the considered  data.  
 Validation of the effect of individual factors. This would  address the question if 
/  how the effect of variations in one input factor (averaging the effect of the 
other factors or keeping these at fixed  values) as anticipated  by the model 
compares with the empirical data.  
 Validation of the relative strength of the factors and of their interactions. This 
would  address the question if the factors that are predicted  as being important 
by the model result as being important also from the data.  
It is expected  that the experience with the mentioned International HRA Empirical 
Study will help in defining how to go about the above concept alternatives. 
While validation against empirical data has the mentioned challenges, alternative 
approaches to validation are being considered  for the short term.  
Indeed, there is a significant history working with the THERP dependence approach, 
in its original formulation or supported  by DTs. This can be used  to draw some 
conclusions on the reasonableness of the numbers produced for dependence 
calculations, i.e. on its so-called  face valid ity (Kirwan, 1997a).  
Data from experts can also be used  to replace empirical data for a validation exercise. 
This can be done in two ways (which are not exclusive). The first is to give case studies 
to the experts and  partition the cases in two sets: one set is used  to inform the 
relationships and build  the model and  the rest is used  to test the prediction capability 
of the model. The other way is to test the predictions against those from ano ther set of 
experts. These options will be considered  in the design of the expert elicitation process.  
6.3 Additional discussion 
It is worth noting that other expert modelling approaches exist that can handle 
dependence among the input factors. Probabilistic models such as influence d iagrams 
and Bayesian belief networks (Phillips et al., 1990) and connectionism networks 
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(Sträder, 2000) are some examples. Research is also being performed by the authors to 
compare the performance of these probabilistic approaches with Fuzzy approaches. 
Finally, note that the so-called  second-generation HRA methods (ATHEANA (Cooper 
et al., 1996), MERMOS (Le Bot et al., 1998), CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998)) do not quantify 
dependence based  on conditional HFEs probabilities as the presented  method assumes. 
Their common notion is that the likelihood of HFEs is driven by performance 
conditions determined by the context where the action takes place, rather than  by 
intrinsic human error probabilities associated  with the task. Following this notion, the 
context must include preceding HFEs and the failure probability estimated  for any 
action should  reflect a) the effect of preceding HFEs on the scenario and on the 
operators’ situation assessment, and  b) the relationships between the actions, which 
would  include many of the dependence factors. In this way, a model of dependence 
remains essential in a second -generation analysis even if the proposed dependence 
assessment method may not be applicable. As second-generation methods have not yet 
been extensively applied , improving dependence assessment and quantifying 
conditional probabilities remain issues of major concern.  
Another way of handling dependence is through the use of dynamic PSA tools, see e.g. 
(Chang & Mosleh, 2007), which allow to d irectly simulate the evolution of the system 
after each human intervention and therefore, in principle, to better define the context in 
which the dependent actions are carried  out.    
7 Conclusions and Outlook 
Human failure dependence assessment is a highly subjective part of HRA and efforts 
to improve the transparency and  repeatability of the assessments are needed. This 
paper proposes a dependence method that is based  on an expert model, built from a 
transparent expert elicitation process. The expert model is a Fuzzy Expert system. This 
representation has been selected  since it is suitable for models mostly built from expert 
judgment, as opposed to empirical data. A working model of dependence has been 
developed to investigate the concepts underlying the proposed method; its internal 
relationships have been set by the authors. The expert elicitation exercise will be 
performed in the future. The model has been applied  for dependence assessment of 
two operator actions in response to an anticipated  transient without scram in a nuclear 
boiling water reactor. 
Improving the transparency and repeatability of human reliability dependence 
assessment, while keeping the method practical to use h ave been the goals of the 
research. The features of the model to achieve these goals are as follows.   
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The proposed method is based  on an explicit, computable model. As in a decision tree, 
an analyst is required  to give judgments on the input factors of the model, and  not 
d irectly on the dependence level (which is the output of the model). While improving 
the repeatability of the assessment, this is also expected  to reduce its uncertainty, 
compared  to the case of giving judgments d irectly on the dependence level. Indeed, 
uncertainty on input judgments exists as well, but with anchors to provide references 
for the scale, the inputs can be made less subjective than the dependence level.  
The computable model is built from a systematic expert elicitation approach, made up 
of two traceable steps. This is important because, in connection with what said  above, 
the accuracy of the results produced by the method depends on the accuracy of the 
computable model. Given that empirical validation of the model accuracy is extremely 
challenging, it is important that the build ing process is traceable, to allow scrutinizing 
the experts’ statements contained  in the expert model.  
With the use of the expert model, the analyst’s input judgments are d irectly and 
formally converted  into the output, the (d iscrete) dependence level. Compared  to a 
decision tree-based  approach, the result gives a dependence assessment that can more 
closely reflect the analysts’ understanding of the dependence factors for a given set of 
tasks.  
Anchor situations are provided as guidance for the analyst’s assessment of the input 
factors. Using up to five input linguistic labels for the factors, compared to the typical 
two of (binary) decision trees, may be perceived  as subject to more subjectivity as well 
as cumbersome by analysts and  experts. However, the anchor points may counteract 
the effect of having more labels for each factor , by provid ing concrete references for 
determining the input factor for the specific case under analysis. 
Neither the HRA analysts nor the experts whose knowledge is represented  by the 
expert model need  to be familiar with Fuzzy Expert systems: no aspect of the Fuzzy 
formalism is shown to analysts and  experts and  they interface only with the input 
linguistic labels and  with the anchor points. This is very similar to the interface of 
decision trees commonly used  (e.g. SPAR-H and the EPRI HRA Calculator ®). 
Once the model is finally built, verification and validation are also important aspects. 
In particular, validation of the depend ence model against empirical data is 
significantly challenging, due to the d ifficulty of collecting failure probability data. 
However, it is expected  that it will be possible to draw  some conclusions on the model 
face valid ity. Indeed, although the currently used  THERP-based  approaches may suffer 
from a number of limitations, there is a significant experience in working with these 
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and this can be used  to check the reasonableness of the results produced by the 
proposed method.  
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Table 1. The EPRI HRA Calculator ® dependence decision tree (Grobbelaar et al., 
2005). 












0-15 min Yes 
High CD 
Low HD 
15-30 min Yes 
High HD 
Low MD 
30-60 min Yes 
High MD 
Low LD 
> 60 min Yes 
High LD 
Low ZD 
NOTE: The above table from the EPRI HRA Calculator ® applies for two actions performed by the same 




Table 2. Linguistic variables, qualitative labels and anchor points for the working 
model 
Linguistic variable Qualitative labels Anchors1 (provided by the 
expert) 
Closeness in time close in time, widely 









Cue similarity None/very low, low, medium, 
high,  very high/complete 
Different sets of indicators for different 
parameters 
Different sets of indicators for the 
same parameter 
Single indicator for the same parameter 
Different sets of indicators for the 
same physical quantity 
Same sets of indicators for the same 
sets of parameters 
Function/goal similarity None/very low, low, medium, 
high,  very high/complete 
Different functions by different 
systems 
Different functions by the same system 
Same function by different systems 
Same function by the same system 
Similarity of performers None/very low, low, medium, 
high,  very high/complete 
TSC vs control room shift  
Different teams 






 It is expected that multiple sets of time anchors will be distinguished in the final model. For example, 
time anchors should be placed in different locations on the scale for short and long term actions: a time 
separation of 20 minutes between the two actions, can be considered as wide if the first action is to be 
performed few minutes after the annunciation of the related cues: on the other hand, the same separation 
of 20 minutes can be considered as ―very small‖ if the first action is to be performed within hours from 











(close in time 









Dependency Number of Human Action Failures Rule 
□ - Not Applicable. 
Why?_________________ 
1 s c s na Complete  When considering recovery in a series 
e.g., 2nd, 3rd, or 4th checker 
 
If this error is the 3rd error in the 
sequence, then the dependency is at 
least moderate. 
 
If this error is the 4th error in the 
sequence, then the dependency is at 
least high. 
2 a Complete 
3 d na High  
4 a High  
5 nc s na High 
6 a Moderate 
7 d na Moderate 
8 a Low 
9 d c s na Moderate 
10 a Moderate 
11 d na Moderate  
12 a Moderate 
13 nc s na Low 
14 a Low 
15 d na Low 
16 a Low 
17  Zero 
Figure 1. The SPAR-H dependence decision tree (Gertman et al., 2005). 
 
 
Figure 2. Overview of the dependence model. Different models are needed for pre-




Closeness in time 
Similarity of performers 
Input assessments 










































Figure 3. Analyst elicitation on anchored scale; two analyst input types are shown: 
as a point value (arrow) and as an interval (horizontal bar).  
 
 
Figure 4. Possible association of fuzzy sets and membership functions (trapezoids) 





























Input 2  
Anchor B Anchor D Anchor C Anchor A 
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Figure 5. Left: example of computation of the degree to which the Factor 1 input 
assessment matches the label “Low ” and the Factor 2 input assessment the label 
“High” . Right: computation of the degree of activation of the rule If “Factor 1” is 
“Low” and “Factor 2” is “High” THEN “Dependence” is “Medium” as minimum 
value between the degrees to which Factor 1 and Factor 2 input assessments match 




Figure 6. Fuzzy sets and membership functions associated to the THERP 
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Figure 8. Results from elicitation of the input factors and the anchors: the dependence model as seen by the analyst. Anchors may change 
for different typologies of tasks.   
 
Closeness in time Similarity of performers 





Figure 9. Table of rules for the intermediate variable Task relatedness (partial fill from 
the expert statements). 
 
 








Figure 11. Analyst judgments on input factors for failure to control low pressure 
injection given failure to inhibit ADS - case 1: judgments given as point values matching 
the anchors. 
 
Figure 12. Fuzzy input with trapezoidal MFs for case 1: point estimates matching the 
anchors.  
Closeness in time 
Similarity of functions/goals Similarity of performers 
Similarity of cues 
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Figure 13. Output of dependence level for case 1: point estimates matching the anchors. 
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Figure 14. Analyst input on the anchored scale for case 2: point estimates between 
anchors and labels. 
 
Figure 15. Fuzzy input with trapezoidal MFs for case 2: point estimates between anchors 
and labels.  
Closeness in time 
Similarity of functions/goals Similarity of performers 
Similarity of cues 
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Figure 17. Analyst input on the anchored scale for case 3: range assessment. 
 
Figure 18. Fuzzy input with trapezoidal MFs for case 3: range assessment.  
 
Closeness in time 
Similarity of functions/goals Similarity of performers 
Similarity of cues 
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ZERO LOW MEDIUM HIGH COMPLETE
 
Figure 20. Output of dependence level for cases 4 (left) and 5 (right). 
 
 
